5 for the France Poland and 3 for the Spain

It is entitled to ask: why the international community has reacted a little late to the military unrest which broke out this summer in the Caucasus Certainly, international observers and the public were then riveted on Beijing. Of course, the conflict between the Georgia and the Russia is anything but new. But it is also need to find the origin of this lack of discernment. Because these events are in breccia wisdom: globalization should make obsolete national conflicts at the territorial objectives. The tragic events of August show that it is nothing. On the contrary, they show a close connection between the interdependence of international operators and the increased risk to attend classic clashes on the basis of traditional claims (territories, populations) often old.

The regions of Caucasus and the shores of the Caspian Sea offer an image of a growing globalization of the exploitation of its energy resources since 1991. The majority of the oil and gas is exported to European markets, and tomorrow, no doubt, to China. This huge international transfer passes through a complex Web of pipelines and pipelines. Some are in principle in service, more projects. Their plots and their funding are both economic geopolitics and international financial engineering. Thus, the famous Baku-Tbilisi-Ceylhan to directly connect the gas and oil of Azerbaijan to the Turkey, without going through Russian territory. It might be connected to the Nabucco pipeline planned to directly supply gas with the countries of the European Union from the Turkey and the Austria. But a rival pipeline project is envisaged under the name of Southstream. It would avoid the Turkey directly by winning the Hungary via the Bulgaria, and thus move by Russian Black Sea compressor stations. Multinational consortia manage all these projects. Next to the States concerned, there are large groups such as BP, Total, Norwegian Statoil, without forgetting Eni and, of course, the sprawling Gazprom.

Increased international interdependence and multiple intermediation have been emerge a network system complexes, often opaque, that wakes up a desire to direct intervention by the States for opposite reasons. The Russia sees the opportunity to restore its diplomatic power lost, in seeking to control the spider's Web. The Georgia is meant to oppose, and recall, by its intervention, its national interests in a political game scrambled by the anonymity of the financial interests. The conflict between is an exemplary case of unintended nationalist consequences generated by this system.

This globalization of the gas resources management also offers levers to the States concerned, by reason of interdependence that she weaves between country providers and consumers. But these interdependencies is asymmetries that shifting forces reports. On the one hand, the energy dependence on gas from the Russia varies greatly from one country of the European Community to the other 80 to 13.5 for the France Poland and 3 for the Spain. On the other hand, producing countries depend, them, consumers, not to mention intermediaries in a dominant position, as the Russians, while both producers and regulators. These dependencies do not have the same characteristics. It is less the mechanical effect of a narrowing of the energy market as an indirect financial penalty of capital markets on investment fear that producers and especially the Russia. Gas weapons to targeted consumers has rapid and reversible effects. The response in terms of financing is less controllable. Its effects can be irreversible.

More generally, globalization promotes the return of the States one thinks of sovereign wealth funds and reactive conventional conflicts between nations. But, in modifies also the terms and conditions by transforming their motivations and strategic means to States. It would be illusory to scrutinize the next crisis by focusing on the mirror. With the economy, the weapons have perhaps changed.