Yes she caught us as an elastic in the face

Daniel Cohen. The euro has faced in recent months in a significant Jolt which can be compared to that of the 1930s. At the time, the international monetary system flew apart, the standard gold had to be abandoned in the chaos, causing a currency war and a dangerous game committed between nations that accumulated stocks of gold - as the France which was in some way the Germany of today - with their surplus of current payments and those who lost the gold. And when, in 1931, in the wake of the stock market crash on Wall Street, the biggest Austrian Bank, Kreditanstalt, failure and requested the support of the France, it took months to respond trying to get in return for political concessions.

D. C. All this to say that there is nothing of genetics in the German behaviour in this crisis. When a country is in a position of strength, he tends to enjoy... That said, the current crisis differs from that of the 1930s by other aspects. As a first step, the shock caused by the bankruptcy of Lehman Bank in September 2008 was very well absorbed by the euro area. The ECB injected liquidity. A year after, it could say that the crisis had been perfectly handled, without competitive devaluations of the time.

D. c. Yes, she caught us as an elastic in the face. When the crisis facing Greek, financial markets and politicians realized that Europe was absolutely not armed politically or institutionally to cope.

Alain Cotta. I agree with Daniel Cohen that we are in a very uncertain situation, that the euro crisis is both behind and in front of us. But you say that this crisis has been properly absorbed by the euro, but no one said how it would have been absorbed otherwise, including the France. Devaluations have never been to me a fear: that of 1958 has been successful, that of 1969 also, without inflation, with resumption of strong growth of the economy. It cannot be overlooked that could have been. I note that, after ten years of euros, the French economy experienced its worst decade since 1945: growth to roughly zero, stronger than ever, external deficit considerable deficit, all accompanied by an unemployment affecting about 3 million people. You can argue that the situation would have been even worse without the euro, but, personally, I do not get this argument.

D. c. non. Successful devaluations referred to Alain Cotta carried out cold. When they are under the pressure of an international crisis, they are almost always missed, because that which devalues is generally not the only one to do so. Alain Cotta dream that the France devalues against the mark, but imagine the Spain, the Italy and other déva-lueraient also to us. Or the French outside the Germany deficit represents only half of its deficit with the euro area.

D. C. It has protected a major monetary crisis. Without it, all currencies are would be depreciated with the threat of imported inflation and lower growth yet. But, today, the most urgent issue is the management of the financial crisis. Europe's crisis was triggered by the Greek crisis, who announced the crisis of the Ireland and possibly Spain, but these crises are not similar. In the latter two cases, it is not at all caused by the financial crisis. Early 2008, the Ireland had a balanced budget and the Spain was given as a model for the modesty of its debt. Spanish banks were cited as an example and their system for dynamic provisions has even inspired Basel III rules!

D. C. These countries have benefited, or rather abused a zone of monetary and financial stability sitting on interest rates extremely low. This is what economists call the paradox of peace: when it is backed by very cheap refinancing conditions, it is the excess. In the Greek case, the authorities have let the debt. Where Irish and Spanish, it is a real estate crisis which turned into a major banking crisis, and then in the debt crisis when the State came to the rescue of the banks. Therefore, the Irish public deficit passed the balance to 32 of GDP.

D. C. Analysis error made, including in Germany, is to believe that it is a crisis of public finances, Governments, while this has nothing to do originally. It is a financial, systemic problem. Return to balance in a hurried manner will reduce growth and will not prevent the next crisis.

A. C. There is a point on which we both agree: the euro has been and remains a political currency, it has been a sas between the common market and a federal Europe. And Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, Mitterrand and Kohl believed. Or a single currency implies conditions we have developed as early as 1985: neighbouring economic structures, a common budget that is not embryonic as the current and standards and the common disciplines. These conditions were never met. Will the be a day I think

Daniel Cohen. The euro has faced in recent months in a significant Jolt which can be compared to that of the 1930s. At the time, the international monetary system flew apart, the standard gold had to be abandoned in the chaos, causing a currency war and a dangerous game committed between nations that accumulated stocks of gold - as the France which was in some way the Germany of today - with their surplus of current payments and those who lost the gold. And when, in 1931, in the wake of the stock market crash on Wall Street, the biggest Austrian Bank, Kreditanstalt, failure and requested the support of the France, it took months to respond trying to get in return for political concessions.

D. C. All this to say that there is nothing of genetics in the German behaviour in this crisis. When a country is in a position of strength, he tends to enjoy... That said, the current crisis differs from that of the 1930s by other aspects. As a first step, the shock caused by the bankruptcy of Lehman Bank in September 2008 was very well absorbed by the euro area. The ECB injected liquidity. A year after, it could say that the crisis had been perfectly handled, without competitive devaluations of the time.

D. c. Yes, she caught us as an elastic in the face. When the crisis facing Greek, financial markets and politicians realized that Europe was absolutely not armed politically or institutionally to cope.

Alain Cotta. I agree with Daniel Cohen that we are in a very uncertain situation, that the euro crisis is both behind and in front of us. But you say that this crisis has been properly absorbed by the euro, but no one said how it would have been absorbed otherwise, including the France. Devaluations have never been to me a fear: that of 1958 has been successful, that of 1969 also, without inflation, with resumption of strong growth of the economy. It cannot be overlooked that could have been. I note that, after ten years of euros, the French economy experienced its worst decade since 1945: growth to roughly zero, stronger than ever, external deficit considerable deficit, all accompanied by an unemployment affecting about 3 million people. You can argue that the situation would have been even worse without the euro, but, personally, I do not get this argument.

D. c. non. Successful devaluations referred to Alain Cotta carried out cold. When they are under the pressure of an international crisis, they are almost always missed, because that which devalues is generally not the only one to do so. Alain Cotta dream that the France devalues against the mark, but imagine the Spain, the Italy and other déva-lueraient also to us. Or the French outside the Germany deficit represents only half of its deficit with the euro area.

D. C. It has protected a major monetary crisis. Without it, all currencies are would be depreciated with the threat of imported inflation and lower growth yet. But, today, the most urgent issue is the management of the financial crisis. Europe's crisis was triggered by the Greek crisis, who announced the crisis of the Ireland and possibly Spain, but these crises are not similar. In the latter two cases, it is not at all caused by the financial crisis. Early 2008, the Ireland had a balanced budget and the Spain was given as a model for the modesty of its debt. Spanish banks were cited as an example and their system for dynamic provisions has even inspired Basel III rules!

D. C. These countries have benefited, or rather abused a zone of monetary and financial stability sitting on interest rates extremely low. This is what economists call the paradox of peace: when it is backed by very cheap refinancing conditions, it is the excess. In the Greek case, the authorities have let the debt. Where Irish and Spanish, it is a real estate crisis which turned into a major banking crisis, and then in the debt crisis when the State came to the rescue of the banks. Therefore, the Irish public deficit passed the balance to 32 of GDP.

D. C. Analysis error made, including in Germany, is to believe that it is a crisis of public finances, Governments, while this has nothing to do originally. It is a financial, systemic problem. Return to balance in a hurried manner will reduce growth and will not prevent the next crisis.

A. C. There is a point on which we both agree: the euro has been and remains a political currency, it has been a sas between the common market and a federal Europe. And Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing, Mitterrand and Kohl believed. Or a single currency implies conditions we have developed as early as 1985: neighbouring economic structures, a common budget that is not embryonic as the current and standards and the common disciplines. These conditions were never met. Will the be a day I think