The first true France debate on aging societies will be the dependence. It is very important, because it focuses both on intergenerational solidarity mechanisms and conditions of financing it. It is also exemplary, because it tells us about the evolution of social protection and the new constraints of management of a company such as ours in the next few years. But it does speak to one of the aspects of the topic. In fact, many other debates will appear, as was the case at the Forum of Economic Transition, demographic Transition at Dauphine Chair. The most obvious, is that of the labour market. Known, the France has today one of the employment rate of older the lowest in Europe, with 39 of 55-64 years in activity, far behind the average European, 46. At the other end of the pyramid of ages is similar, the rate of employment of less than 25 years was 32 end 2008, 38 in the European Union and 52 in the United Kingdom.
Youth as seniors must obviously be the subject of specific actions. But policies aimed only to increase their rate of employment are not enough. The short term, these policies may negatively influence our productivity. Seniors averaged less productive and less skilled than the active population, but remain perhaps more productive than young assets under 30 years. Continuing education, retraining and second career opportunities few fault at the time.

Similarly, the French education system is trolling: he is able to form that 41 of graduates of higher education and more than 17 of French youth left the education system without diploma. Graduates of schools of business and engineering schools account for 4 of a generation. Thus, if the size of the generation of 16-24 years, that between today on the labour market, is almost equivalent to the share in retirement, 60 of youth are only sufficiently trained to replace the outgoing generation. And the policy of continuous training is not up to our ambitions.
In fact, our aging economies are bound to push back the frontiers of productivity. Because the challenge of the industrialized countries is to continue to create wealth with a workforce near stagnant or declining to finance growth with a productive capital whose evolution is uncertain - both as regards savings to human capital.
Our ageing societies are also rethought solidarity. The lengthening of life expectancy creates a fourth age and allows coexistence in four generations. But this progress requires us to re-examine the share of social expenditure and to redefine the role of the State as a provider of well-being. The coming intergenerational conflict will be a new type: they develop set family solidarity, national cohesion by resting the weight of the lengthening of life on young assets. What is at stake, this are the egalitarian foundations of our system of social protection: based originally on the archetype of the average man who met the standard requirements of mass productive apparatus, must today take into account more heterogeneous, less linear life course and a life expectancy at large uncertain ages. The departure of the baby boomeurs retired transformed into emergency of long term evolution: reform becomes an imperative.
Remains the problem of the financing of these policies, in the budgetary framework that we know. Social spending, more than 60 years today capture 20 of GDP. By 2030, they could consume approximately 30. Can you afford to invest as much in passive expenditure while annual 1.2 productivity gain that we hardly grappillons is already largely totally dedicated to old age Because the difficulties of funding for aging societies are doubles. They must ensure the financing of old age risk, in particular by the formation of a long savings and productive investment, to win the productivity points which lack, so the growth absolutely necessary to maintain social cohesion at the same time.